With the U.S. Supreme Court due to consider Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, an Indian gaming case, Bryan Newland takes a closer look at the Class III gaming compacts in Michigan:
In any negotiation, it is critically important to understand the capabilities and the constraints of every party at the negotiating table. The negotiation of new gaming compacts between the “1993 Tribes” and the State of Michigan will be constrained by a number of factors, including: decisions made in the past 20 years, economics, and modern politics. In this post, we are going to look at some of the factors constraining the State’s bargaining power in compact negotiations. Note that this review is based on the assumption that the State of Michigan’s objective is to execute a new compact that imposes significant revenue sharing obligations on the 1993 Tribes, and subjects them to greater regulation by the Michigan Gaming Control Board; it is also based on the assumption that the 1993 Tribes’ collective objective is to maintain something approximating the status quo. Here are some of the big limitations on the State’s bargaining power.Get the Story:
A CLOSER LOOK AT GAMING COMPACT NEGOTIATIONS IN MICHIGAN PART DEUX: The State’s Bargaining Position (Turtle Talk 10/1) Relevant Documents:
Supreme Court Order List | Supreme Court Docket Sheet No. 12-515 6th Circuit Decision:
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community (August 15, 2012)
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